Tales Off The Rails

Guardian Angel

2010-01-11T11:29:00.000-08:00

Right after the Glendale Metrolink 100 crash, Steve Lopez, a columnist with the Los Angeles Times, wrote an article about how a fateful day can alter the lives of ordinary people and launch them into the spotlight. In that article, he interviews a man who credits a blond guardian angel who raced up the stairs to the upper level with saving his life. Cox followed him, only to find after the crash that the seat he had occupied was completely gone, the train crumpled in on itself. It also tells the story of other survivors.

Click here to read the entire article.

Bruce Gray, the engineer of Metrolink 100, left the operating compartment of his train after seeing the car on the tracks and applying the emergency break, turned and ran up the stairs, yeling to people to hold on. His friends and family thought perhaps he might be that guardian angel. so he called Lopez, and Lopez interviewed him for another article about the crash where he relives the moment of impact with the freight train locomotive.

Click here to read the entire article.

Metrolink CEO steps down

2009-12-12T16:07:00.000-08:00

Safety on Metrolink continues to make headlines here in Los Angeles as Metrolink shakes up its management.

CEO David Solow has stepped down as the head of the agency, but he has not been fired. His new title will be advisor: interagecy initiatives.

People have been pretty hush-hush about how this came about, but one article mentions that he will work on safety issues until his contract runs out in June 2010. Maybe the board just wanted to keep him on the payroll until the contract runs out, and then they can fail to renew it.

Some sources have said that the board has not been happy with his performance since the Chatsworth crash and have indicated that Solow has been since overwhelmed.

Here is a site with details about the CEO.

False Clear

2009-12-11T08:31:00.000-08:00

A couple of weeks ago, on November 22, 2009, I reported for work on my regular route as engineer of Amtrak’s Sunset Limited, traveling from Los Angeles to Maricopa, Arizona.

I had just returned from a great weekend with family and friends at the Rincon Parkway in Ventura, CA, and looked forward to an uneventful trip aboard the lead locomotive, engine 85, in the company of a student engineer and his instructor.

We had been running on clear signals (green) at around 5:30 PM as we headed through Palm Springs, California, at 79 mph. With the headlights and ditch lights on bright, we could still only see about 1,000 to 1,500 feet ahead of the train. Should there have been an obstruction on the track, this would give us only about 11 to 14 seconds to recognize and react. But the clear signals let us put obstructions in the back of our minds.

When we reached the west end of the Ferrum siding that runs along the Salton Sea, a popular tourist attraction for those who enjoy boating and fishing, we saw a clear signal, but just behind that, we could see the headlight of a freight train. Apparently, we were to be running around someone.

Experience said that since we were on clear signals and the freight train had its headlight on dim, that it must be a remote locomotive operated from the head end of the train (DPU). The DPU is an unmanned locomotive entrained, usually at the rear of the train, to provide additional power using remote capabilities that are found on the manned locomotive at the front of the train. The engineer of a freight train that has a DPU would not have the ability to turn the headlight off completely, as the rule would require him to turn his light off since his train was stopped and off of the main track and in a siding. Then it happens.

We entered the control point of the west end of Ferrum, the point where the switch to enter or leave the siding is, and rushed by the DPU locomotive with little time to do anything but have our lives flash before our eyes. We noticed as we flew by that the DPU motor was definitely in the control point and not clear of the circuit. The signal should have been red. It seemed as if the locomotive was only five feet from sideswiping us. We immediately contacted the engineer of the freight train to let them know what we had seen. We decided not to stop the train since by the time we comprehended what happened, we were already out of harm’s way.

The freight train was the Union Pacific #7739, the QWCEW of the 22nd operating east bound. The freight crew responded by saying they would remain put until instructed by the dispatcher to move. We made the 911 call to the dispatcher, who in turn called out the forces to investigate.

Of course, no one has asked us for a statement to explain what we saw. We have had to do our own follow up to find out just exactly how that happened.

But as it turned out, Union Pacific had sent out a newer signal maintainer to install a new relay on that west end the Ferrum siding. This maintainer used an outdated diagram and installed the relay incorrectly. So this relay would not sense a train, car, locomotive, or even a broken rail in the area of the control point that is associated with the turn out portion of the main track to the siding. So it did not sense the 7,000+ ton UP freight train extending out on this turn out portion of the siding! As long as no part of the train was on the main line track in the control point, the system would now always show a clear signal until fixed.

The worst of it is that the signal maintainer obviously did not test the system as required by Federal law to ensure that all was working properly after he altered the signal system

On our next trip through that area, UP officials tested us to ensure that we were doing everything right during operation, a normal occurance, and one of the officials the same one who had responded to our 911 regarding the false clear on November 22.

He indicated that after measuring, we calculated that we avoided a collision with the freight train by only 40 feet. If that freight train had stopped only forty feet sooner than it did, we would have plowed into him with all of our passengers on board. After realizing that our lives had been spared by only feet, our initial reaction was to think about Chatsworth train collision and the report of the false clear seen by witnesses before the crash.

In the Chatsworth crash, even though the signal system was tested and nothing was found to be wrong, I’m concerned about reports of a signal maintainer on and around the apperatus just after the crash and prior to the FRA arriving to complete an inspection. This, of course, would be prohibited. I don't want to say cover up, but I did mention this to the FRA and I was sluffed off. The report was final; the engineer was at fault because he was texting and not paying attention. Yet that engineer did everything else right by blowing the whistle for two road crossings, and slowing down for the 40 MPH curve. But he never looked at the signal? I don't believe it. I have now experienced a false clear, which places a whole new perspective on signal systems for me.

More on red lights...

2009-12-08T08:45:00.001-08:00

Here is more information on the Metrolink engineer who ran the red and the subsequent reaction from politicians.

The problem with the media is that incidents like this leave so many questions. The media never gives the complete story or the "accurate" story. But as a reader, I am not necessarily informed enough to ask all of the right questions. Here are a few, however, that enter my mind. I mentioned that Bruce has a "false green" a couple of weeks ago. Would that be counted as running a red? The signal SHOULD have been red. How many times does that happen? Is there any way to know?

Is four an unusual number or run reds in a year's time? Not that it would be ok for four trains to run reds, but I am just wondering how this number compares to past years. Is the problem worse now that in the past? Better after the Chatsworth crash?

Metrolink contracted with Veolia Transportation to run its trains in July 2005. Prior to that, Metrolink was run by Amtrak. As a result, Veolia hires engineers, one of whom was Robert Sanchez, the engineer deemed responsible for the the Chatsworth crash. So I wonder about engineers hired under Veolia vs. Amtrak. And the safety record under the two contractors. Is it the same? Are things worse?

Anyway, I guess my point is that once again, the media gives information without any context so it is very difficult to judge what to make of the information. And although it is easy to point fingers at the engineers, and sometimes rightly so, I just wonder whether we are geting the full story. It is easy to throw the engineer under the bus...er, I mean the train, especially in an attempt to protect a government agency.

Here is a Los Angeles Times article about the incident.

2009-12-05T14:55:00.000-08:00

Posted by Bruce Gray, engineer of Metrolink 100:

See this is the problem appointing those who have little or no experience with railroading and are more political than industry-savvy. Those in charge of making the operating decisions for Metrolink have simply tried to make it look like they are doing everything they can to make passengers and their railroad look and feel safer.

My point is this; they did not install ATS. They installed IIATS. This stands for Inert Inductor Automatic Train Stop. These are Wayside inductors that are placed forward or in front of permanent speed restrictions. In other words, when a train is required to make a significant speed reduction, say because of a curve, these inductors are placed at a distance in front of the curve so that if the engineer fails to reset the alarm that sounds after passing the inert inductor, the train will automatically set a full service application of the brakes in what is known as a penalty application. Yes a mouthfull but very simple.

Speaking of simple, it is so simple that once the engineer depresses the reset button after the alarm sounds and does nothing else, you probably guessed right, the train will not stop prior to the curve. Now, there is money well spent for added safety.....NOT!!!!!

This is a political public ploy to make the public, most of whom know nothing about railroading either, feel as if Metrolink is doing everything it can to make them safer as they commute. So what about the red signals, like at Chatsworth? IIATS has nothing whatsoever to do with preventing a train from running a red signal. That is ATS, which is associated with the signal system. But again, this was not installed. Oh and by the way, ATS itself would not keep a train from running a red signal as has been reported. Sure, with ATS, the inductors are associated with the signals and the aspects they display, but it doesn't stop the engineer from blowing a red signal. Yes the alarm sounds as he or she passes a signal that displays indications less favorable than green. And yes, the engineer must acknowledge the alarm and press the reset button within 8 seconds. But once he or she does that, he or she is free to run right by the next signal at full speed with no other protection device to stop or slow the train. But again they didn't install ATS; they installed IIATS.

Anybody feeling safer yet?

Running Red

2009-12-04T14:43:00.000-08:00

Apparently a Metrolink engineer ran a red light last week. Investigators are looking into it. What is so disturbing is that running a red light is what caused the Chatsworth train crash that killed 25 people last year. Even more disturbing is that this would be the fourth insident of a Metrolink train running a red light since the Chatsworth crash.

And more disturbing than that? Bruce, the engineer of Metrolink 100 involved in the Glendale 2005 train crash, had a false green signal last week while on duty. That means he was given the green light, so he proceeded as normal, but in reality, the light should have been red. He was able to put the train in emergency but came within forty feet of hitting a freight train!

Here is a Los Angeles Times article about the incident.

Woman Hit By Train in Glendale

2009-11-23T15:37:00.000-08:00

A woman was killed today right near the site of the Glendale Metrolink crash when she was hit by an Amtrak train. Apparently she was crossing the tracks pushing a shopping cart when she tripped and was struck.

My heart goes out to the woman's family and friends, but it also goes out to the engineer, who is often ignored in these situations. It cannot be easy for him or her to have to live with being at the controls when someone dies, even if there was nothing that he or she could have done to prevent it.

Click here to see article in the Glendale News-Press.

Excerpts and Interviews

2009-11-19T11:03:00.001-08:00

I plan to periodically post excerpts from the book Coffin Car: The Story of Metrolink 100 as well as snippets from interviews with some of the people who were involved in the Glendale Metrolink train crash in 2005. So be sure to look for those: they will probably be posted in serial form. And please forward your comments! I would love your feedback.

The first excerpts will actually be about a 1907 train crash that occurred in roughly the same place (West Glendale) and was also the work of men bent on destruction. I included it as a preface to the book because I like the parallels.

If you were there that day and would like to share your experiences, I would love to hear from you. And it would be great if you would participate on this blog. Or if you know someone who was in Glendale on that fateful day when 11 people lost their lives, tell him or her to check out the blog and to contact me. I would love to talk!

Coffin Car

2009-11-12T21:22:00.000-08:00

The working title of the book about the Glendale train crash is Coffin Car.

For the uninitiated, Metrolink, as well as many other commuter systems throughout the country, operates its commuter trains using the push-pulthe locomotive pushes the train from behind. Railroads do this to avoid the extra time, money and space needed to turn a train around at the end of a line.

When the train is running in push mode, a modified passenger car with an operation compartment built into the front leads the train down the track. The engineer then controls the train from this cab car.

Here is what the cab car looks like leading a train down a track. The engineer is sitting at the front right hand window as one would look out the front of the train.

And here is what the inside of the engineer's compartment looks like:

Compare this to the protection afforded the engineer and the passengers by a locomotive pulling the train!

It should not be surprising that in railroad parlance, the cab car is often referred to as the coffin car. Inevitably, trains will hit things on the track, whether they are there inadvertently or purposefully. And the 450-ton locomotive is more likely to protect those on the train, especially the engineer.

For one, the cab car weighs half as much, leaving it vulnerable to easily "floating" off the tracks, and it has virtually no crush distance. Plus it lacks a "cowcatcher." A cowcatcher is the v-shaped device attached to the front of a train to deflect obstacles (such as cows!) off the track. Metrolink does not have cowcatchers on its cab cars but only a flat end plate. This makes it easy for objects on the track to become wedged under the car.

However, officials insist that cab cars are safe, and they continue to be used throughout the country.

Metrolink 100, which hit the Jeep Grand Cherokee wedged on the tracks, was traveling in push mode, with Bruce Gray at the controls in the cab car, a car that literally became a coffin car.

Book!

2009-11-09T13:18:00.000-08:00

Some of you know that I am working on a book about the 2005 Metrolink train wreck in Glendale, California. Briefly, this was the crash caused by Juan Manuel Alvarez, who parked his Jeep Grand Cherokee on the tracks near the Chevy Chase crossing on January 26th, 2005. He claimed that he was distraught and wanted to commit suicide. But he changed his mind at the last moment and leaped out of the way. He then stood by and watched as the tragedy that he put into play unfolded in that misty, dark morning.

It was a perfect storm, of sorts. Metrolink 100, traveling toward downtown Los Angeles with about 250 passengers on their morning commute, struck the Jeep, and immediately derailed. It plowed forward though the front end of the cab car had fallen off the tracks. The out of control train then ran head on into the locomotive of a freight train that was parked on a storage track known as the Glendale slide. The impact caused Metrolink 100 to buckle right into the path of oncoming Metrolink 91, which was carrying commuting passengers out of the city.

In the end, three trains collided, eleven people died, and nearly 200 were injured. And Alvarez was convicted of eleven counts of first-degree murder and is currently serving eleven consecutive life sentences.

Once you peal back the wreckage left, you discover a story of love, of hate, of sorrow, of joy. Of bravery and of cowardice. It is a story about people reacting in extreme circumstances. There is a saying (and I cannot find it - thanks Google!) that says something about how difficult times do not build character. Instead, they reveal it. I think that is true in the case of this horrendous time in hundreds of people's lives.

Update on Philly Death

2009-11-06T13:15:00.000-08:00

I just wanted to add that the man who was killed by the train in Philadelphia has been identified: Kevin Sparks, 34, of Sharon Hill, PA. ABC news reports indicate that he was a rail inspector and "was walking with a flagman on the northbound tracks when he was hit from behind by a southbound train . . . . The train was running on different tracks than normal because of equipment problems with another train."

Our hearts go out to Kevin Sparks' friends and family.

Also, investigators think the fire the day before the death was from electrical fire that started at the front of the train. witnesses said flames were shooting out from the front of the train. Passengers kicked out emergency windows to climb out of the train.

I would imagine that that must have been terribly frightening for not only the passengers but also for the engineer. Thank goodness everyone was safe.

Problems in Philadelphia

2009-11-05T07:51:00.001-08:00

Evidently Los Angeles is not the only city to have serious safety concerns when it comes to commuter trains. A rail worker was killed on the tracks during the morning rush hour. This was following a rail car fire as a commuter train headed downtown at 7 AM on Wednesday morning. Yikes!

The story is here.

Union Says No! to Cameras in Cabs

2009-11-03T10:45:00.000-08:00

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen has filed suit against Metrolink's use of the cameras as an invasion of privacy and wants the cameras turned off. The union proposes a cell phone jamming system.

I have a couple of quesitons about this. First, would a cell phone jamming system be able to jam only the engineers phone? I do not know anyhting about the technology of this. However, passengers would want to have access to their phones while riding the train.

My second question is whether or not this union is actually representative of its members. As an involuntary memeber of a union myself, I know that I disagree with most of the positions my union takes on a variety of issues. So is it the membership that opposes the cameras, or is it the union leaders? They are not the same thing.

Click here to read the entire article.

Cameras in Cabs

2009-11-02T10:27:00.000-08:00

As a direct result of the Chatsworth train crash, when 25 people were killed because apparently the engineer was texting a teenager and missed a red signal, Metrolink has invested $1 million to place cameras in the locomotives and lead cab cars of all of its commuter trains. Apparently, such cameras have been very effective in buses, not only in securing that the drivers are safe but also exonerating drivers when accidents are not their fault.

Here is the story.

query letter

2009-11-01T09:10:00.000-08:00

News of another deadly Metrolink commuter train crash splashes across the front pages: “Head-on Collision.” “Twenty-five Dead.” “Bodies Still Trapped in Wreckage.”

But it is just the latest chapter in train catastrophes. And Bruce Gray knows it only too well.

The life of Bruce Gray, engineer of Metrolink 100, changed irrevocably on January 26, 2005, at 6:03 am, when Juan Manuel Alvarez left his gas-soaked Jeep Grand Cherokee on a train track in Glendale, California, in an apparent suicide attempt.

Alvarez had a change of heart as the Metrolink barreled towards him at 79 mph. And he ran off, leaving his car straddling the tracks. Moments later, when the Metrolink slammed into the Jeep, it set off a chain reaction that destroyed three trains, injured nearly 200, and killed eleven.

As an agent interested in representing narrative non-fiction, you might be interested in the book Coffin Car: The Crash of Metrolink 100. It is the story of the Glendale train crash and the personal journey of not only Engineer Bruce Gray as he learns to cope with the aftermath of the accident, but also of other key people involved in the incident, such as Juan Manuel Alvarez, the man bent on committing suicide but surviving and killing eleven others, Karen Hernandez, the Costco employee who called 911; Curt Williamson, the first fireman on the scene; Scott McKeown, a passenger who died that day.

The Metrolink dispatcher tapes, the 911 tapes, the LAFD reports, and the criminal trial transcripts will round out the story for a complete retelling of the crash and its aftermath.

In the end, readers will have gotten to know the victims and the heroes of this disaster. They will care about these people whose lives were so tragically interrupted and have the opportunity to see justice served when they learn of the conviction of Alvarez of eleven counts of first degree murder.

I have been teaching English and journalism at Mission College for fifteen years and publishing as a freelance writer for the past six, with articles appearing in The Los Angeles Times and Christian Science Monitor among other national and local publications.

Thank you for your consideration. I am including the first five pages of chapter 1, but I would be happy to send you a complete proposal at your convenience. Feel free to contact me should you need any other information.

Sincerely,
Vickie Oddino
818/426-3063
vaoddino@earthlink.net

2009-10-30T14:14:00.000-07:00

Metrolink has begun installing Automatic Train Stop systems (ATS) at strategic points along its lines. The system is meant to stop a train that has blown through a signal. This was prompted, of course, by the Chatsworth Metrolink crash when the engineer ran a red signal and 25 people were killed. This system would do nothing, however, to prevent tragedies such as the Glendale crash, when a car is blocking the track.

Here is a Daily news article about the ATS.

Analysis of Metrolink Safety

2009-10-29T13:29:00.000-07:00

I have been meaning to post this article from the LA Times for a few weeks. Sorry I am just getting to it. It primarily focuses on a couple of intersections that have been deemed chronically unsafe. It blasts Metrolink for not caring about the safety of its passengers, yet it also plugs the MTA as being more safety-conscious.

Click here to read the entire article.

Metrolink Settles Lawsuits in 2005 Glendale Crash

2009-10-21T14:07:00.000-07:00

The Los Angeles Times reports that Metrolink has settled most of the lawsuits stemming from the Glendale crash. Click here to see article.