False Clear

A couple of weeks ago, on November 22, 2009, I reported for work on my regular route as engineer of Amtrak’s Sunset Limited, traveling from Los Angeles to Maricopa, Arizona.

I had just returned from a great weekend with family and friends at the Rincon Parkway in Ventura, CA, and looked forward to an uneventful trip aboard the lead locomotive, engine 85, in the company of a student engineer and his instructor.

We had been running on clear signals (green) at around 5:30 PM as we headed through Palm Springs, California, at 79 mph. With the headlights and ditch lights on bright, we could still only see about 1,000 to 1,500 feet ahead of the train. Should there have been an obstruction on the track, this would give us only about 11 to 14 seconds to recognize and react. But the clear signals let us put obstructions in the back of our minds.

When we reached the west end of the Ferrum siding that runs along the Salton Sea, a popular tourist attraction for those who enjoy boating and fishing, we saw a clear signal, but just behind that, we could see the headlight of a freight train. Apparently, we were to be running around someone.

Experience said that since we were on clear signals and the freight train had its headlight on dim, that it must be a remote locomotive operated from the head end of the train (DPU). The DPU is an unmanned locomotive entrained, usually at the rear of the train, to provide additional power using remote capabilities that are found on the manned locomotive at the front of the train. The engineer of a freight train that has a DPU would not have the ability to turn the headlight off completely, as the rule would require him to turn his light off since his train was stopped and off of the main track and in a siding. Then it happens.

We entered the control point of the west end of Ferrum, the point where the switch to enter or leave the siding is, and rushed by the DPU locomotive with little time to do anything but have our lives flash before our eyes. We noticed as we flew by that the DPU motor was definitely in the control point and not clear of the circuit. The signal should have been red. It seemed as if the locomotive was only five feet from sideswiping us. We immediately contacted the engineer of the freight train to let them know what we had seen. We decided not to stop the train since by the time we comprehended what happened, we were already out of harm’s way.

The freight train was the Union Pacific #7739, the QWCEW of the 22nd operating east bound. The freight crew responded by saying they would remain put until instructed by the dispatcher to move. We made the 911 call to the dispatcher, who in turn called out the forces to investigate.

Of course, no one has asked us for a statement to explain what we saw. We have had to do our own follow up to find out just exactly how that happened.

But as it turned out, Union Pacific had sent out a newer signal maintainer to install a new relay on that west end the Ferrum siding. This maintainer used an outdated diagram and installed the relay incorrectly. So this relay would not sense a train, car, locomotive, or even a broken rail in the area of the control point that is associated with the turn out portion of the main track to the siding. So it did not sense the 7,000+ ton UP freight train extending out on this turn out portion of the siding! As long as no part of the train was on the main line track in the control point, the system would now always show a clear signal until fixed.

The worst of it is that the signal maintainer obviously did not test the system as required by Federal law to ensure that all was working properly after he altered the signal system

On our next trip through that area, UP officials tested us to ensure that we were doing everything right during operation, a normal occurance, and one of the officials the same one who had responded to our 911 regarding the false clear on November 22.

He indicated that after measuring, we calculated that we avoided a collision with the freight train by only 40 feet. If that freight train had stopped only forty feet sooner than it did, we would have plowed into him with all of our passengers on board. After realizing that our lives had been spared by only feet, our initial reaction was to think about Chatsworth train collision and the report of the false clear seen by witnesses before the crash.

In the Chatsworth crash, even though the signal system was tested and nothing was found to be wrong, I’m concerned about reports of a signal maintainer on and around the apperatus just after the crash and prior to the FRA arriving to complete an inspection. This, of course, would be prohibited. I don't want to say cover up, but I did mention this to the FRA and I was sluffed off. The report was final; the engineer was at fault because he was texting and not paying attention. Yet that engineer did everything else right by blowing the whistle for two road crossings, and slowing down for the 40 MPH curve. But he never looked at the signal? I don't believe it. I have now experienced a false clear, which places a whole new perspective on signal systems for me.