Safety on Metrolink continues to make headlines here in Los Angeles as Metrolink shakes up its management.
CEO David Solow has stepped down as the head of the agency, but he has not been fired. His new title will be advisor: interagecy initiatives.
People have been pretty hush-hush about how this came about, but one article mentions that he will work on safety issues until his contract runs out in June 2010. Maybe the board just wanted to keep him on the payroll until the contract runs out, and then they can fail to renew it.
Some sources have said that the board has not been happy with his performance since the Chatsworth crash and have indicated that Solow has been since overwhelmed.
Here is a site with details about the CEO.
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Friday, December 11, 2009
False Clear
A couple of weeks ago, on November 22, 2009, I reported for work on my regular route as engineer of Amtrak’s Sunset Limited, traveling from Los Angeles to Maricopa, Arizona.
I had just returned from a great weekend with family and friends at the Rincon Parkway in Ventura, CA, and looked forward to an uneventful trip aboard the lead locomotive, engine 85, in the company of a student engineer and his instructor.
We had been running on clear signals (green) at around 5:30 PM as we headed through Palm Springs, California, at 79 mph. With the headlights and ditch lights on bright, we could still only see about 1,000 to 1,500 feet ahead of the train. Should there have been an obstruction on the track, this would give us only about 11 to 14 seconds to recognize and react. But the clear signals let us put obstructions in the back of our minds.
When we reached the west end of the Ferrum siding that runs along the Salton Sea, a popular tourist attraction for those who enjoy boating and fishing, we saw a clear signal, but just behind that, we could see the headlight of a freight train. Apparently, we were to be running around someone.
Experience said that since we were on clear signals and the freight train had its headlight on dim, that it must be a remote locomotive operated from the head end of the train (DPU). The DPU is an unmanned locomotive entrained, usually at the rear of the train, to provide additional power using remote capabilities that are found on the manned locomotive at the front of the train. The engineer of a freight train that has a DPU would not have the ability to turn the headlight off completely, as the rule would require him to turn his light off since his train was stopped and off of the main track and in a siding. Then it happens.
I had just returned from a great weekend with family and friends at the Rincon Parkway in Ventura, CA, and looked forward to an uneventful trip aboard the lead locomotive, engine 85, in the company of a student engineer and his instructor.
We had been running on clear signals (green) at around 5:30 PM as we headed through Palm Springs, California, at 79 mph. With the headlights and ditch lights on bright, we could still only see about 1,000 to 1,500 feet ahead of the train. Should there have been an obstruction on the track, this would give us only about 11 to 14 seconds to recognize and react. But the clear signals let us put obstructions in the back of our minds.
When we reached the west end of the Ferrum siding that runs along the Salton Sea, a popular tourist attraction for those who enjoy boating and fishing, we saw a clear signal, but just behind that, we could see the headlight of a freight train. Apparently, we were to be running around someone.
Experience said that since we were on clear signals and the freight train had its headlight on dim, that it must be a remote locomotive operated from the head end of the train (DPU). The DPU is an unmanned locomotive entrained, usually at the rear of the train, to provide additional power using remote capabilities that are found on the manned locomotive at the front of the train. The engineer of a freight train that has a DPU would not have the ability to turn the headlight off completely, as the rule would require him to turn his light off since his train was stopped and off of the main track and in a siding. Then it happens.
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
More on red lights...
Here is more information on the Metrolink engineer who ran the red and the subsequent reaction from politicians.
The problem with the media is that incidents like this leave so many questions. The media never gives the complete story or the "accurate" story. But as a reader, I am not necessarily informed enough to ask all of the right questions. Here are a few, however, that enter my mind. I mentioned that Bruce has a "false green" a couple of weeks ago. Would that be counted as running a red? The signal SHOULD have been red. How many times does that happen? Is there any way to know?
Is four an unusual number or run reds in a year's time? Not that it would be ok for four trains to run reds, but I am just wondering how this number compares to past years. Is the problem worse now that in the past? Better after the Chatsworth crash?
Metrolink contracted with Veolia Transportation to run its trains in July 2005. Prior to that, Metrolink was run by Amtrak. As a result, Veolia hires engineers, one of whom was Robert Sanchez, the engineer deemed responsible for the the Chatsworth crash. So I wonder about engineers hired under Veolia vs. Amtrak. And the safety record under the two contractors. Is it the same? Are things worse?
Anyway, I guess my point is that once again, the media gives information without any context so it is very difficult to judge what to make of the information. And although it is easy to point fingers at the engineers, and sometimes rightly so, I just wonder whether we are geting the full story. It is easy to throw the engineer under the bus...er, I mean the train, especially in an attempt to protect a government agency.
Here is a Los Angeles Times article about the incident.
The problem with the media is that incidents like this leave so many questions. The media never gives the complete story or the "accurate" story. But as a reader, I am not necessarily informed enough to ask all of the right questions. Here are a few, however, that enter my mind. I mentioned that Bruce has a "false green" a couple of weeks ago. Would that be counted as running a red? The signal SHOULD have been red. How many times does that happen? Is there any way to know?
Is four an unusual number or run reds in a year's time? Not that it would be ok for four trains to run reds, but I am just wondering how this number compares to past years. Is the problem worse now that in the past? Better after the Chatsworth crash?
Metrolink contracted with Veolia Transportation to run its trains in July 2005. Prior to that, Metrolink was run by Amtrak. As a result, Veolia hires engineers, one of whom was Robert Sanchez, the engineer deemed responsible for the the Chatsworth crash. So I wonder about engineers hired under Veolia vs. Amtrak. And the safety record under the two contractors. Is it the same? Are things worse?
Anyway, I guess my point is that once again, the media gives information without any context so it is very difficult to judge what to make of the information. And although it is easy to point fingers at the engineers, and sometimes rightly so, I just wonder whether we are geting the full story. It is easy to throw the engineer under the bus...er, I mean the train, especially in an attempt to protect a government agency.
Here is a Los Angeles Times article about the incident.
Saturday, December 5, 2009
Posted by Bruce Gray, engineer of Metrolink 100:
See this is the problem appointing those who have little or no experience with railroading and are more political than industry-savvy. Those in charge of making the operating decisions for Metrolink have simply tried to make it look like they are doing everything they can to make passengers and their railroad look and feel safer.
My point is this; they did not install ATS. They installed IIATS. This stands for Inert Inductor Automatic Train Stop. These are Wayside inductors that are placed forward or in front of permanent speed restrictions. In other words, when a train is required to make a significant speed reduction, say because of a curve, these inductors are placed at a distance in front of the curve so that if the engineer fails to reset the alarm that sounds after passing the inert inductor, the train will automatically set a full service application of the brakes in what is known as a penalty application. Yes a mouthfull but very simple.
Speaking of simple, it is so simple that once the engineer depresses the reset button after the alarm sounds and does nothing else, you probably guessed right, the train will not stop prior to the curve. Now, there is money well spent for added safety.....NOT!!!!!
See this is the problem appointing those who have little or no experience with railroading and are more political than industry-savvy. Those in charge of making the operating decisions for Metrolink have simply tried to make it look like they are doing everything they can to make passengers and their railroad look and feel safer.
My point is this; they did not install ATS. They installed IIATS. This stands for Inert Inductor Automatic Train Stop. These are Wayside inductors that are placed forward or in front of permanent speed restrictions. In other words, when a train is required to make a significant speed reduction, say because of a curve, these inductors are placed at a distance in front of the curve so that if the engineer fails to reset the alarm that sounds after passing the inert inductor, the train will automatically set a full service application of the brakes in what is known as a penalty application. Yes a mouthfull but very simple.
Speaking of simple, it is so simple that once the engineer depresses the reset button after the alarm sounds and does nothing else, you probably guessed right, the train will not stop prior to the curve. Now, there is money well spent for added safety.....NOT!!!!!
Friday, December 4, 2009
Running Red
Apparently a Metrolink engineer ran a red light last week. Investigators are looking into it. What is so disturbing is that running a red light is what caused the Chatsworth train crash that killed 25 people last year. Even more disturbing is that this would be the fourth insident of a Metrolink train running a red light since the Chatsworth crash.
And more disturbing than that? Bruce, the engineer of Metrolink 100 involved in the Glendale 2005 train crash, had a false green signal last week while on duty. That means he was given the green light, so he proceeded as normal, but in reality, the light should have been red. He was able to put the train in emergency but came within forty feet of hitting a freight train!
Here is a Los Angeles Times article about the incident.
And more disturbing than that? Bruce, the engineer of Metrolink 100 involved in the Glendale 2005 train crash, had a false green signal last week while on duty. That means he was given the green light, so he proceeded as normal, but in reality, the light should have been red. He was able to put the train in emergency but came within forty feet of hitting a freight train!
Here is a Los Angeles Times article about the incident.
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